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Abstract
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are computer systems which monitor a network with the
aim of discerning malicious from benign activity on that network. While a wide range of approaches
have met varying levels of success, most IDSs rely on having access to a database of known attack
signatures which are written by security experts. Nowadays, in order to solve problems with false
positive alerts, correlation algorithms are used to add additional structure to sequences of IDS alerts.
However, such techniques are of no help in discovering novel attacks or variations of known attacks,
something the human immune system (HIS) is capable of doing in its own specialised domain. This
paper presents a novel immune algorithm for application to the IDS problem. The goal is to discover
packets containing novel variations of attacks covered by an existing signature base.
1 Introduction
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are usu-
ally based on a fairly low level model of network traf-
fic. While this is good for performance it tends to
produce results which make sense on a similarly low
level which means that a fairly sophisticated knowl-
edge of both networking technology and infiltration
techniques is required to understand them.
Intrusion alert correlation systems attempt to solve
this problem by post-processing the alert stream from
one or many intrusion detection sensors (perhaps
even heterogeneous ones). The aim is to augment
the somewhat one-dimensional alert stream with ad-
ditional structure. Such structural information clus-
ters alerts in to scenarios sequences of low level alerts
corresponding to a single logical threat.
A common model for intrusion alert correlation al-
gorithms is that of the attack graph. Attack graphas
are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) that attempt to
represent the various types of alerts in terms of their
prerequisites and consequences. Typically an attack
graph is created by an expert from a priori informa-
tion about attacks. The attack graph enables a corre-
lation component to link a given alert with a previ-
ous alert by tracking back to find alerts whose con-
sequences imply the current alerts prerequisites. An-
other feature is that if the correlation algorithm is run
in reverse, predictions of future attacks can be ob-
tained.
In implementing basic correlation algorithms us-
ing attack graphs, it was discovered that the output
could be poor when the underlying IDS produced
false negative alerts. This could cause scenarios to be
split apart as evidence suggestive of a link between
two scenarios is missing. This problem has been ad-
dressed in various systems by adding the ability to
hypothesise the existence of the missing alerts in cer-
tain cases. Ning et al (2004) go as far as to use out of
band data from a raw audit log of network traffic to
help confirm or deny such hypotheses.
While the meaning of correlated alerts and pre-
dicted alerts is clear, hypothesisd results are less easy
to interpret. Presence of hypothesised alerts could
mean more than just losing an alert, it could mean
either of:
1. The IDS missed the alert due to some noise,
packet loss, or other low level sensor problem
2. The IDS missed the alert because a novel varia-
tion of a known attack was used
3. The IDS missed the alert, because something not
covered by the attack graph happened (totally
new exploit, or new combination of known ex-
ploits)
This work is motivated specifically by the problem
of finding novel variations of attacks. In our case a
variation is determined to be an attack which exploits
the same vector as an attack detected by an existing
rule. The basic approach is to apply AIS techniques
to detect packets which contain such variations. A
correlation algorithm is taken advantage of to pro-
vide additional safe/dangerous context signals to the
AIS which would enable it to decide which packets
to examine. The work aims to integrate a novel AIS
component with existing intrusion detection and alert
correlation systems in order to gain additional detec-
tion capability.
2 Intrusion Alert Correlation
Although the exact implementation details of attack
graphs algorithms vary, the basic correlation algo-
rithm takes an alert and an output graph, and modifies
the graph by addition of vertices and/or edges to pro-
duce an updated output graph reflecting the current
state of the monitored network system.
For the purposes of discussion, an idealised form
of correlation output will be defined which hides spe-
cific details of the correlation algorithm from the AIS
component. This model, while fairly simple, ade-
quately maps to current state of the art correlation
algorithms. Due to space constraints we do not de-
scribe the full model here.
3 Danger Theory
The advent of Polly Matzingers Danger theory in has
inspired a great deal of research in to the functioning
of the innate immune system. A subsystem of the hu-
man immune system (HIS) which is apparently able
to distinguish between benign and pathogenic mate-
rial within the organism and initiate an adaptive im-
mune response.
For this purpose our “libtissue” AIS framework,
a product of a danger theory project (Aickelin et al,
2003), will model a number of innate immune system
components such as dendritic cells in order to direct
an adaptive T-Cell based response.
Dendritic cells (henceforth DCs) are of a class of
cells in the immune system known as antigen present-
ing cells. They differ from other cells in this class in
that this is their sole discernable function. As well
as being able to absorb and present antigenic mate-
rial DCs are also well adapted to detecting a set of
endogenous and exogenous signals. These biological
signals are abstracted in our system under the follow-
ing designations:
1. Safe: Indicates a safe context for developing tol-
eration
2. Danger: Indicates a change in behaviour that
could be considered pathological
3. Pathogen Associated Molecular Pattern
(PAMP): Known to be dangerous
All of these environmental circumstances, or in-
puts, are factors in the life cycle of the DC. A suf-
ficient concentration of signals may trigger matura-
tion along one of two differented pathways. One of
which is associated with a reactive and the other with
a tolerogenic T-cell response.
In the proposed system, DCs are seen as liv-
ing among the IDS environment. This is achieved
by wiring up their environmental inputs to certain
changes in the IDS output state. Populations of DCs
are tied to the prediction vertices in the correlation
graph, one DC for each predicted attack. Packets
matching the prediction criteria of such a vertex are
injested by the corresponding DC.
A prediction veretex can either be upgraded to an
exploit vertex, changed to a hypothesised vertex, or
be deleted depending on subsequent alerts. These
possibilities will result in either a PAMP, danger or
safe signal respectively.
These signals initiate maturation and consequent
migration of the DC to a virtual lymph node where
they are exposed to a population of T-cells generated
using the IDSs signature base in much the same way
as in a gene library. This is combined with partial
matching algorithms to find a T-cells to bind to the
antigen being presented by the DC.
Upon successful binding, the original packet corre-
sponding to the culprit antigen is tagged and logged
much like a normal alert.
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